



THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF RIPARIAN
PROPRIETORS.
The law relating to the subject which we are about to consider,
forms, from the nature of the element to which it is applied, one
of the most interesting portions of our jurisprudence; and the many
valuable interests which it now affects, give to it a much more general
importance than it formerly possessed. Its protection now not
only extends over the rights which the occupant of a cottage has in
a stream, the simple use of which is, that it flows in beauty near his
door, but determines questions concerning rights upon the security of
which immediately depend the prosperity and wealth of large manu-
facturing districts, it shall be our endeavor to show how perfectly
all these rights are secured and guarded.
It is evident, from the terms commonly used when treating of
this branch of the law, and the maxims in which many of the prin-
ciples upon which it is administered are announced, that the early
English jurists made frequent reference to the Roman law. But
whatever they may have borrowed from that source has been so
modified in the transition, and so blended in the general system
which they fashioned, that it is a matter rather of curious inquiry
than of real utility to seek to ascertain what has been adopted
and what created. By a perfect fusion of materials, and not by
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elegant mosaic work, has our noble system of the common law been
constructed.
We shall, as fully as we may in the limited space prescribed,
consider the rights of riparian proprietors in reference to their
ACQUISITION, as connected with the title to land lying on streams
above tide water; the ENJOYmENT of those rights, and the attend-
ant obligations, independent of special grants or statutes'; their
TRANSF-ER, by grant, license, and prescription, and the privileges
thus conferred.
The interest that may be held in certain things must depend on
their nature. While the soil of the earth and its products are
subjects of absolute property, there can only be established in the
elements of air, light, and running water, a usufructuary right. It
seems to have been the policy of the law, in assigning an ownership
to every thing, to acknowledge only such an ownership as would
prove most widely beneficial.
According to the principle of the maxim eu7s est solum ejus est
usque ad ccelum, the owner of the soil over which awatercourse natu-
rally flows, holds, as a corporeal right, or hereditament, a property in
the water.' A grant of land, whether by the State or an indivi-
dual, carries with it a right to the water flowing over it, although
it is not described as land covered with water; unless there be con-
tained in the grant an exception or reservation by which the right
to the water is retained.2 The right, then, being originally founded
in the ownership of the soil, it becomes necessary to determine what
terms will carry the property in the soil covered with water.
When the limits of a grant are distinctly defined by metes and
bounds, without reference to a watercourse, no question can arise as
to the right of the grantee to all waters within its limits. But one
of the most frequent ways of bounding tracts of land, especially in
the early settlement of a country, being by the permanent natural
marks in the face of the country, as its mountains and streams,
questions frequently arise as to the exact extent of grants thus
I Buckingham vs. Smith, 10 Ohio, 288.
2 Browne vs. Kennedy, 5 Harr. and Johns. 195.
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made. In the determination of these questions courts have had
reference to the character of the object designated as a boundary.
It was early settled in England, that where an estate was bounded
by navigable water, the boundary line was the line marked by high
tides, but when upon unnavigable streams, the thread of the stream
must be taken as the boundary. All tide waters being there con-
sidered, for the purposes of boundary, as navigable, and all streams
above tide water, as unnavigable. The propriety of adopting such
a rule in this country, where many of our rivers are actually navi-
gable for thousands of miles above tide water, has been frequently
doubted, and in some States the rule has been entirely discarded.'
In a great majority of the States, however, the English rule has been
adopted, and under it the principles upon which the rights of parties
are to be determined, have become quite well established.' In a
recent case before the Supreme Court of the United States, in which
the question was as to the extent of the admiralty jurisdiction of
the United States Courts, it is held, that the English definition of
the term navigable, is entirely inapplicable to the great lakes and
rivers of this country.3 But the decision of this case, going merely
to the defining of a jurisdiction, cannot be considered as extending
to the disturbing of private rights, which have been or may be
acquired under the rule, as it has been understood and adopted in
the courts of the several States, when determining upon the rights
of property, 4 and we shall, therefore, proceed to consider the rights
of riparian proprietors, as they exist under the rules of our common
law.
Where grants of land are bounded by water, it is necessary to
ascertain the character of the water, not only for the purpose of
finding the exact boundary line, but that we may also ascertain the
extent of the incident rights that have been acquired. The pro-
Carson vs. Blazer, 2 Binn. (Penn.) 476; 2 Port. (Ala.) 436; 1 McCord (S. C.)
580.
2 Commiss. of Canal Fund vs. Kempshall, 16 Wend. (N.Y.) 404; 5 Pick. (Mass)
190; 9 N. H. 461; 3 Scam. (Ills.) 500; 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 193; 16 Ohio, 540; 1
Rand. (Va.) 417.
3 Propeller Genesee Chief vs. Fitzhugh, 12 Howard, (5 et.) 443.
i See Covert vs. O'Conner, 8 Watts (Penn.) 470.
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prietary interest in tide-waters, as well as the property in the soil
over which they flow, is in the public.' If a stream be uninfluenced
by tides, and unboatable, the proprietors of its banks take title to
the bed of the stream, and the entire and uninterrupted use of the
water. But if a stream be boatable, they hold their rights subject to
the easement which the public have in it, as a highway for water-
craft. It is only in fresh waters that riparian rights, 6trictly
speaking, can be said to exist, although the term is applied to the
more limited rights held by those bounding on tide-waters. We
purpose to confine our attention to the law governing fresh-water
streams.
It is sometimes a question of no little difficulty to determine,
from the words of a grant, whether or not it is to be viewed as
being bounded by a water-course; as in cases where certain objects,
designated as the termini of the lines running towards a stream,
stand some distance from the bank, and the course between them is
said to run "up the stream," or "down the stream," or "along the
stream," or by other similar words referring to the water-course.
Where a map is referred to, and the lines are marked as terminating
on the stream, the grantee will hold to the stream.2 And although
no such reference is made, yet if there be nothing in the circum-
stances of the case showing a clear intent on the part of the grant
to stop short of the bank or margin of the stream, the lines must
be so extended. 3 The general rule to be gathered from the cases is,
that courses and distances must yield to a designated natural boun-
dary. The boundary being carried to the bank, or edge of the
stream, the grantee will hold, by common right, to the centre or
thread of the stream, unless the bed of the stream and water privi-
leges be expressly reserved. Finally, by whatever words a grant
may be bounded on a fresh water stream-whether they be "to the
river," or "to the bank of the stream," or "the margin," and then
"up" or "down the same"-the grantee will hold by the common
law to the centre of the stream.4
When the grants are bounded on a natural pond or lake, the
Hale's De Jure Maris. 2 Reid vs. Langford, 3, Marsh. 99, (Ky) Rep. 420.
3 1 Hay. (N. C.) 237. Where the lines were extended to the natural boundary.
4 Jennings, ex parte, 6 Cowen, (N. Y.) 518; 3 Kent'8 Com. 428, and note.
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grantee will only hold to the water's edge.' But where, by means
of a dam or other works, an artificial pond has been made on a run-
ning stream, grants bounded on it will give title to the centre of
the stream.' In cases where a natural pond has been raised by
artificial means, there may be a latent ambiguity in the grant, that
can be explained by parol proof.3
The right to the bed and the water of a stream is generally found
divided between opposite riparian proprietors, each holding to the
thread of the stream, or usque ad filum aquce. And the difference
between the rights which a party holds in a stream running through
his land, and one which thus forms his boundary, consists in their
extent, not in their nature ; in the former case he has a title to the
whole, in the latter to one-half of the stream.
The soil which may by imperceptible deposition be added to the land
lying on a water-course, belongs to the proprietors of the estates on
which it is deposited.4 This increase, called alluvium, must be
divided among the several proprietors along the line of its forma-
tion, in proportion to the extent of their lines upon the old margin.
If the stream suddenly change its course, reliding the soil over
which it was wont to flow, and making for it a new channel, thi
boundaries of the estates affected remain according to their former
lines ;1 and in the case of a boatable river, the soil over which the
public once had an easement, is relieved, and the easement is held
in the new course of the river. When, as in cases of avulsion, the
soil of one man's estate is, by the manifest force of the stream, taken
suddenly and transferred to another, no property will be conferred,
unless by acquiescence.7
_slands, not otherwise appropriated, if in the middle of the stream,
are divided between the opposite riparian proprietors; but if they
are on one side of the centre of the stream, they belong to the
owner of that side.8 The sand-bars and islands that may be formed
in fresh-water streams are apportioned in the same manner.
I Canal Commis. vs. People, 5 Wend. (N. Y.) 413.
2 Smith vs. Miller, 5 Mason, C. C. 196. 3 Waterman vs. Johnson, 13 Pick. 261.
A Case of Batture, New Orleans, 2 Amer. Law Jour. 282.
5 Rule given in note on 47 p. Angell on Water-Courses.
6 Lynch vs. Allen, 4 Dev. & Bat. (N. C.) 62. 7 Hale's De Jure Marls.
8 Ingraham vs. Wilkinson, 4 Pick. 268.
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Along with the other rights incident to the interest which a ripa-
rian proprietor holds in a water-course, is the exclusive right of
fishery in that part of the stream included within his territorial
limits.' And this right cannot be abridged by a custom which others
may have established of fishing in such waters; unless it be set up
by prescription as belonging to some estate.2 This absolute and
unshared right that a riparian proprietor has to fish in his own
waters, has been termed a several fishery, as distinguished from a
free or common fishery, which is a public right to fish in public or
tide-watersA Trespass will lie for an injury done to a several fish-
ery, whether it is held as an incident to the proprietorship of the
land, or by a grant conveying the right of fishery, without the title
to the soil.'
Having noticed the rights acquired by the holding of land lying
on water-courses, we come to the consideration of the law governing
their enjoyment.
The same stream that flows by one estate, giving rise to riparian
rights, may in its course be the boundary of many others, to which,
originally, like rights are given. As, from its nature, no property
'can be held in the corpus of running water, these rights must be
limited to its use as it passes along. The language of the law is,
aqua .urrit et debit currere, ut currere solebat.
Many of the various uses which flowing water subserves, do not
affect perceptibly the character of the stream. It imparts fertility to
the soil, and beautifies the landscape through which it flows; supplies
the natural wants of man and beast, and may, in many cases, be
applied as the motive power to machinery, without causing the least
injury to the rights of those situated either above or below on the
same stream. When thus used in strict accordance with the maxim,
sic utere tuo ut alienum non Icedas, there can be no doubt but that
the use is such as the law sanctions. But there are cases where a
profitable use cannot well be made of the stream without affecting,
to a certain extent, the rights of other riparian proprietors; and it
Smith vs. Miller, 5 Mason, C. C. 191
Waler vs. Lilly, 4 Pick. 145; Gatewood's cs. 6 Coke, R. 60.
3 Melvin vs. Whiting, 7 Pick. 79; Schultes on Aquatic Rights, p. 60.
4 Hart vs. Hill, Wharton, (Pa.) 124.
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must be determined how far this will be permitted. The authorities
lay down as the limit, a reasonable use.
A distinction between a natural and an artificial use of water,
seems to be now quite well established.' To make such a use of
water as the wants of man and beast absolutely require to sustain
existence, may well be considered a reasonable use. And if in thus
using, the upper riparian proprietor exhausts the stream, no'action
will lie against him for such entire appropriation. If, however, the
use made is only calculated to increase his comfort and prosperity,
the law will not permit it at the expense of the rights of others.
Those over whose lands nature causes the water first to flow, being
first in position, have thus an opportunity of prior use, but the right
is still limited by the reasonableness of the use.
In some of the early cases in this country, the use of water for
the purposes of irrigation was sustained as a reasonable use, pro-
vided the water not absorbed by the soil was returned to its natural
channel.2 But the later cases only go to the extent, that such use
may be made, provided it does not materially diminish the quantity
of water naturally flowing in the stream.3 Irrigation not being
regarded as an absolute necessity, it cannot be maintained as a
paramount right.
The general rule governing the use of running water, is, that it
must be used in such a manner as not to be inconsistent with, or
prejudice 'the right which other riparian proprietors have to the use
of the entire stream in its naturalflow by their estates.
It is evident that every detention of water by dams or diversions,
must, to a certain extent, reduce, by evaporation or absorpiion, the
quantity of water, and affect the rapidity of the cur'rent. When
these effects are insensible, or inevitable from the establishment of
dams for the fair and reasonable use of the water-not materially
affecting the rights of other proprietors, there is no actionable wrong
done. The question in such cases must turn on the nature and
extent of the injury.4  To deny the. right of causing such slight
I Evans vs. Mereweather, 3 Scam. (IlM) 496; Wood vs. Ward, Law Jour. R.
Aug. 18,49.
Perkins vs. Dow, 1 Root's, (Conn.) 535; Weston vs. Alden, 7 Mass. 136.
Anthony vs. Lapham, 3 Pick. 175; Arnold vs. Foot, 12 Wend. 330.
' Palmer vs. Mulligan, 3 Caine's, (N. Y.) 307.
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variations in the quantity or the current of the water, would be to
prevent many profitable uses of it, and leave one of the most valua-
ble of powers unemployed. The law here, as in many other cases,
acts with a reasonable reference to public convenience and general
good, and is not betrayed into a narrow strictness subversive of
common use, nor into an extravagant looseness which would destroy
private rights.' The question as to the reasonableness of the time
of the detention, is for a jury to determine.
In the exercise of the usufructuary right which a riparian pro-
prietor has in water, he may take advantage of its momentum, or
impetus, as it flows through his land, but in so doing he must not
throw back-water on the lands of upper riparian proprietors, or
flood, at times, in an unreasonable manner, the lands of those
below.2  It is only to the fall of the water within the boundaries of
his own estate that he has any title, and to those limits must the
effects of his use be confined.' He must not disturb the natural
flow of the stream above his estate, and must give the full flow of
the stream, in its natural channel, where it leaves his land.'
Where there are opposite riparian proprietors, it is not lawful for
either to draw off any part of the water, without the consent of the
other; for the title which each has, is not to any specific part or
portion of the stream, but to an equal use of the entire stream. The
property in the stream is'indivisible. And the joint proprietors
must use'it as an entire stream in its n~tural channel ; a severance
would destroy the rights of all.' And where mills have been erected
on either side of a private river, and in times of drought the greater
proportion of the water flows to one side of the main channel, the
riparian proprietor whose mill is left without sufficient water, cannot
erect a permanent dam to turn the water to his mill, but, it seems,
may, under the direction of the court, excavate in the bed of the
river, and so obtain a fair proportion of the water.' If in the erec-
tion of a dam or other works, the proprietor of one bank places
' Tyler vs. Wilkinson, 4 Mason, c. c. 401.
2 Merrit vs. Brinkerhoof, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 306.
3 M'Calinot vs.Whittaker, 3 Rawle, (Pa.) 84. 4 Howell vs. McCoy, 13 Rawle, 397.
Vandenburg vs Vanbergen, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 212.
6 Arthur vs. Case, I Paige, (N. Y.) Ch. 447.
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materials beyond the thread of the stream, he becomes a trespasser,
and the opposite proprietor may remove them; and if having done
it with proper care, an injury results to the remaining portion of
the works, be is not liable.' Where opposite proprietors have be-
come owners in severalty, of parts of a dam extending across the
stream, there is an implied covenant, running with the land, that
each will keep his part in repair, so long as he continues to uise the
water; and when he abandons the use, the other has the right to
repair the whole.
2
If lands be inundated, and injury sustained, by reason of the
erection of any dam, an action will lie, as for a private nuisance.3
And besides the remedy at law, the party whose land is overflowed
may protect it against the encroachments of the water, and if the
result be an injury to the original wrong-doer, he has no legal
ground of complaint.4 Where the water-course is unlawfully turned
upon the land of another, no right is conferred, and the water may
be returned to its former channel by the wrong-doer, at any time
within twenty years.5
When it is necessary to the protection of any land from being
overflowed, or carried away by the force of a river, works that shall
be a sufficient defence may be built; but they must not be so con-
structed as to throw the water back in times of ordinary floods, to
the injury of other proprietors.' The flooding of land, or annoying
a mill below, either by wilfully discharging the water from a mill-
pond in unreasonable quantities, or by the unskilful construction
of a dam which is swept away, are injuries for which the law gives
a remedy. The party who constructs a work for the retaining of
water, must use such care as shall be proportionate to the extent of
the injury which would be likely to result, if the work should prove
insufficient. If the stream upon which it is erected is subject'to
extraordinary floods, it is not enough that he builds a work suffi-
cient to withstand ordinary floods. He must under such circum-
stances build with the same care that he would if the whole risk
Wigford vs. Gill, Cro. Eliz. 269. 1 Runnels vs. Bullen, 2 N. H. 531.
3 Alford's Case, 9 Rep. 59. 4 Merritt vs. Parker, Coxe, (N. J.) 460.
5 Shields vs. Arant, 3 Green's (N. J.) Ch. 234.
6 Rex vs. Trafford, 1 B. & Aol. 874.
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were his own.' But a proprietor cannot be held liable for conse-
quences which are remote and unforeseen ; as where winds and
heavy rains should fortuitously unite their effects with the back-
water of a dam, and carry off a bridge. 2 The maxim, causa pro-
pinqua non remota, spectatur, which is so frequently applied to
mark the limits of liability, must govern all such cases. Neither
must these restrictions be taken as applying to those increased
damages from floods which necessarily result from the erection of
any dams upon running streams. These must be regarded as inse-
perable from a reasonable use of the water. It is better for the
whole community, that these slight damages should be suffered in
times of flood, and even greater damages on extraordinary occa-
sions, than that the whole power of the water, for mechanical pur-
poses, should not be used.
Another of the rights of riparian proprietors, that is held sub-
ject to certain limitations, is that of fish ery. Although it is an
exclusive right,' and may be pursued with nets, or seines, yet it
must not be so pursued as to injure the rights of fishery that may
exist in others.' And the weirs and dams built upon a stream
must be so constructed as not to prevent fish from ascending and
descending the stream. In many of the States there are statutes
regulating very minutely the exercise of this right. There are,
also, statutes extending or limiting and controlling the general
rights and obligations of riparian proprietors ; but upon the law
under these, our limits forbid us to remark. Where they exist, the
common law must, of course, be administered as modified by them.
No one has a right, by using a water-course, or by other means,
to corrupt it so as to render it unwholesome or offensive.' And
when the water is so used as to render the atmosph~ere impure, an
action for damages will lie by those whose health may be affected.
7
The considerate care of the law has applied to all cases where ripa-
I Mayor and Corporation of N. Y. City vs. Bagley, 3 Denio, 433.
Town of China vs. Southwick, 3 Fairfax, (Me.) 238.
' Case of River Banne, Ireland, Davics Rep. 149.
Commonwealth vs. Ruggles, 10 Mars. 391.
- Weld vs. Ilornby, 7East. 195; 3 Kent's Corn. 411.
Co. Lit. 200: b, 13 Hen. 7, 26. T Story vs. Hammond, 4 Ohio, 831.
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rian rights are exercised, the just maxim, sic utere tuo ut non alie-
num lmedas.
In several modern cases, the question of the applicability of the
law governing the use of water-courses on the surface of the earth,
to subterranean streams, has been very ably discussed. And if
there is a Well founded distinction between cases where water is, by
underground diversion, taken from an artificial well, or spring, in
an adjoining close,' and those where the water thus withdrawn is
taken from a spring naturally flowing out upon the surface,2 the
authorities harmonize, and the conclusion is arrived at, that where
the water-courses are, to all appearances, wholly subterranean, the
general law does not apply, and the proprietor's right to these
entirely subterranean waters, is as absolute as that which he holds
to the minerals beneath the surface. No such distinction is expressly
laid down in the decisions, but it may be presumed that the courts
have had it in mind in coming to their different conclusions.
But is there a sufficient reason, founded upon principle, for hold-
ing that a party may dig upon his own land and divert water from
his neighbor's well, if he does not do it with the malicious intention
of injuring his neighbor; but that he cannot, lawfully, thus dig if
he thereby diverts water from a spring which naturally issues forth
on an adjoining estate ? The authorities have determined that
there is ; and it is with much hesitation that we venture to express
a doubt as to the soundness of the distinction upon which they pro-
ceed.
The right to the water below the surface, being derived in the
same way as is that to the open running streams-by title to the
land, 'which, in its legal signification, extends indefinitely down-
wards as well as upwards-and it being as much the nature of
water to flow in currents below, as upon the surface, it is difficult
to conceive why, on principle, the law as applied to it should be
different. In the enforcement of a right to an underground water-
course, it would certainly be more difficult, if not quite impossible,
I Roath vs. Driscoll, 20 Conn. 533; Greenleaf vs. Francis, 18 Pick. 117; Acton
vs. Bluntlell, 12 MT. & Wels. 324.
2 Smith vs. Adams, 6 Paige, 435; Balston vs. ]3ensted, 1 Campt. (N. Y.) 463;
Dexter vs. ProTidence Ag. Comp. 7, 1 Story, Cir. Ct. 388.
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to establish its exact extent; but where the evidence could be
rendered clear and conclusive, we see no reason why the right
should not be protected. The mere difficulty of obtaining evidence,
certainly ought not to be considered as varying the right. In Acton
vs. Blundell, the court, having under consideration a case where the
water of a well was diverted by the sinking of coal pits, speaks of
the "unreasonable" consequences that would follow the application
of the law governing surface streams to those under ground; but
may not the law as applied to surface streams, sometimes, produce
consequences, seemingly, quite as unreasonable ? Or, if we are to
look to consequences, may it not, at least, work as unreasonably to
protect the right to a natural spring from injury by diversions, as
to protect a well.P The difference in the magnitude of the interests
might incline a court to sustain, if possible, according to the rules
of law, the greater; but we conceive that the simple fact, that a
man may carry on a very profitable business, by only doing his
neighbor a little injury, is no sufficient excuse for the injury done.
If there be a great difference in the interests, the greater may well
afford to pay for the damage done to the less.
As, to establish a prescriptive right, the use must have been
public and such as might be said to give notice to those whose estate
it affected, there cannot be a prescriptive right gained in subterra-
nean streams; for no man can be presumed to know that his
neighbor's well is supplied by a stream running beneath his own
soil.
Before leaving this part of the subject, it may be well to inquire,
whether by mere prior occupation, short of the period of prescrip-
tion, any title can be acquired to the use of so much of a. stream as
may be appropriated. The doctrine has been laid down, that upon
streams having so gradual a fall as to afford sites for mills only at
considerable distances, the riparian proprietor who first erects his
mill, and raises his dam only to a proper height to create a water
power, has a right to maintain it, although it sets the water back
upon a supra-riparian proprietor so as to prevent him from making
a like use of the water on his own estate. That to this extent prior
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occupation gires an exclusive right.1 If this view could justly be
maintained in cases where all the proprietors were so situated that
no one of them could take advantage of the stream for mill pur-
poses, without setting water back upon the land of another, it
is submitted, that it would work great injustice where an upper
proprietor,"owning for a great distance along the stream, and hav-
ing a sufficient fall altogether upon his own land, should hive the
water so set back as to prevent his erecting a mill, because of the
back-water that he would find upon his wheels.
In cases where mere occupancy gives title, it is upon the suppo-
sition, that there was no previous ownership or right existing to the
thing thus appropriated. But as we have seen that our law regards
water as it naturally flows over an estate-and to that extent-as
an incident to the land, there is no opportunity for the creation of
a title by mere occupancy. Not only is there a previous title, but,
also, a previous use, as every riparian proprietor, necessarily, and
at all times, is using the water running through his estate, in so far
at least as it fertilizes the soil and renders more valuable his estate.2
And again, the Roman law, which is sometimes referred to as
sustaining the proposition that the occupancy of water gives title,'
did not consider running water as a 6onum vacans in which a pro-
perty might be thus acquired; but only as public and common in
the sense that all might use it for the necessary purpose of support-
ing life, 'and held a property in that which they took from the
stream and thus appropriated.4
The only right which prior occupancy can be considered as giving
is, in cases where one proprietor has erected a mill, and a supra-
riparian proprietor then diverts the water, damages may be recovered
for the i7jury to the mill, although before the erection of the mill
a recovery could only have been had for the natural uses of the
water.- And this, we think, need scarcely be put upon the ground
I Cary vs. Daniels, 8 Met. (Mass.) 466;
2 Pugh vs. Wheeler, 2 Dee. & Batt. (N. C.) 50.
3 Higgins vs. Juge, 7 Bing. 692.
4 2 JuSt. 7, 5, 1. Vin. Com. on Just., Dig. B. 43, tit. 13. Angell on Watercourses.
6Mason vs. Hill, 3 Barn. & Ad. 304; Pugh vs. Wheeler, 2 Dev. & Bat. N. 0. 50.
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of prior occupancy; for if the owner of any property g.ves to it an
increased value, and an injury be then done to it, he can recover
for the increased value.
The right to the use of the waters following, as an incident to the
title to the land over which they flow, the most complete mode of
transfer is, by a deed of the land covered by the water, containing
no exception or reservation. It may also be granted as an incor-
poreal hereditament, by deed, devise, or record. And as the title
to things incorporeal lies in grant, and not in livery,' it is only by
one of these modes, or by the establishment of a prescription, from
which a grant is presumed, that a water right can pass from the
proprietorship of the land. The right thus granted may be of the
entire or a" limited use, and made subject to any conditions and
restrictions to which the parties may agree. The nature and ex-
tent of the easement thus created must be determined by the terms
of the grant, in connection with the nature of the right granted.'
So, the rights which, primarily, were held by the owner of the land
bounded on a river, may be found apportioned among many-the
right of fishery being in one; the water power divided among
several; and the title to the soil still remaining in the original
proprietor.
The extent of the right granted is not to be determined by a
strict interpretation of the words of the instrument of conveyance;
for the subject of the grant of a right to erect a dam may be the
water power.
3
And the devise of a mill, and its appurtenances, will not only
confer a right to the use of the water, but will also carry title to the
land connected and used with the mill, and necessary to its bene-
ficial enjoyment. The land in such case being held to pass, not as
appurtenant to the mill, but as being comprehended and sufficiently
described by the word "mill." '
The quantity of water to which any grantee may be entitled by
Co Litt. 9 a.
2 Mayor, &c. vs. Commissioners of Spring Garden, 7 Barr. (Penn.) 349.
3 Nitzell vs. Paschall, 3 Rawle, (Penn.) 76.
4 Whitney vs. Olney, 3 Mason C. C. 280.
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the terms of his grant, must be ascertained by a reference to the
usual and ordinary mode according to which the terms of such a
grant would be fulfilled. He cannot take advantage of any new
discoveries or appliances, not generally known at the time of thc
grant, by which the flow of the water within the prescribed limits
of his use would be increased, to the injury of his grantor or others.'
He may, however, apply the actual quantity granted to any pur-
poses of profit, although, by the letter of the grant it was conveyed
to carry on a particular manufacture.
There are, sometimes, connected with the grant of an incorporeal
hereditament, or easement ii a water-course, secondary easements.
These are such as are necessarily connected with the principal sub-
ject of the grant, or such as without which the grant would be of no
effect. Quando aliquis aliquid concedit, concedere videtur et id
sine quo res uti non potest. Thus the grant of a mill will pass all
the water power used with it ;2 and in the grant of a water right there
is implied all such use of the land as is necessary to its beneficial en-
joyment.3  Where an easement is held in a natural or artificial
stream running through the land of another, the party holding the
easement may enter upon the land, and remove any obstructions
that interfere with his right.4 It is not sufficient that what is
claimed as a secondary easement should be shown to be convenient;
it must be, in common intendment, a part of the thing granted, or
absolutely necessary to its beneficial use.'
The covenants -affecting water rights may be divided, as regards
the nature of the estate on which, and the parties on whom they
are binding, into real and personal.0 Real covenants run with the
land, and bind heirs and assigns; but personal covenants affect only
the individuals making them, or, at farthest, their personal represen-
tations in respect of assets. All implied covenants entered into by
parties to the grant of a water-course, run with the land, binding
I Schuylkill Nay. Co. vs. Moore, 2 Whart. (Penn.) 477.
2 Elliot vs. Sheppard, 12 Shep. (Me.) 371.
3 Kilgour vs. Ashcorn, 5 H. & Johns. (Md.) 82.
4 Prescott vs. Williams' Adm'rs, 5 Met. (Miss.) 429.
5 Whitney vs. Olney, ut. sup. 6 Platt on Covenants, 63.
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the grantor not to disturb the grantee, his heirs or assigns, in its
enjoyment.' And the confirmation of an easement by a grant
gives to the successive owners of the estate to which the service is
due, a right to the benefit conferred. It is not, however, every
covenant that relates to land that can be considered as a real cove-
nant, running with the land. To give it such an operation, it must
affect the nature, quality or value of the estate conveyed, indepen-
dently of collateral circumstances, or must affect the mode of enjoy-
ing it; and to bind an assignee by, or entitle him to the benefit of,
a covenant, there must be a priority of estate between the contract-
ing party and his assigns.2 The case of Norman vs. Wells,3 in which
it is held that a covenant not to let any other site, or establish any
other manufactory, on a certain stream, to be used for a particular
purpose, respected the land, and -was co-extensive with the estate, is
regarded as having carried the power of covenants to run with the
land, to the extreme limits of the law.'
The personal contracts of a riparian proprietor, for the furnish-
ing of water power, whether under seal or not, may be enforced.
They are held binding upon him during his life, and on his personal
representatives after his decease, in respect of assets.'
The rights which are conferred by a parol license are still more
limited in their nature, for they arc only held during the pleasure
of the licensor. So long as a license remains unexecuted, it may be
revoked, unconditionally, at any time ;' but when executed, the re-
vocatioh must, in general, leave the parties in the same condition in
which they stood previous to entering upon its execution.7  Autho-
rity may be given by a license to do an act, or series of acts, upon
another's land, and thus aflord a sufficient excuse for what other-
wise would be a trespass ;' but it cannot create an easement, for
that is only to be created by grant ;9 nor pass an estate in the land,
for that would be directly contrary to the provisions of the Statute
Kent's Com. 471. 2 Hlurd vs. Curtis, 17 Pick. 459. 3 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 138.
Spencer's C. S., note- Smith's R. 85, ib. 134.
Angell on Watercourses, p. 274. 6 Fentinam vs. Smith, 4 East. 107.
Munford vs. Whitney, 15 Wend. 380. 8 4 Kent's Corn. 451.
Hewlins vs. Shippan, 3 B. & Cress. 222.
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of Frauds.' It is a permission founded in personal confidence, and
is gone if the person giving the license transfers the estate, or if
either party die.
Where a license comprises or is connected with a grant, so that
the revocation of the former would defeat the latter, it cannot, in
general, be revoked.2  In such cases the license may well be con-
sidered as a part of, or incident to the grant, and as the gra-It can-
not be revoked, the whole must stand. The distinction, as generally
stated, is, between a mere license and a license coupled with an
interest; and the rule is, that a mere license, though founded on a
valuable consideration, may be revoked; but a license coupled with
an interest is irrevocable. The utmost effect of a license in law is,
that it may work the extinguishment of an existing easement.3
In equity, executed licenses are taken out of the operation of the
Statute of Frauds; not on the ground that an easement, or any
interest in land, passes by the license, but that when a license has
been executed by the licensee making valuable improvements, it
would be against conscience for the licensor to recall his authority. 4
So, where a party has given a license to another to draw off a cer-
tain quantity of water for any purpose, and in consequence money
is expended or improvements made, a court of equity will hold the
license irrevocable. The right under the license, when not specially
restricted, is commensurate with the thing to which it is accessory,
and its duration will be equal to that of the purposes for which it
was given.5
To establish a right to an incorporeal hereditament, or easement,
it is not always necessary to produce a grant from the original pro-
prietor ; for where a party has for a long time peaceably enjoyed a
use, inconsistent with any right which may have been in another, a
grant will be presumed, and the party quieted in his possession.6
Title by prescription is founded upon this presumption of a grant.
The length of time during which an uninterrupted enjoyment must
I Sagden on Vendors and Purchasers, 74.
2 Wood vs. Leadbitter, 13 Mees. & Welsb. 843. 3 Gale & Wheat. on Easem. 14.
4 Le Fever vS Le Fever, 4 Serg. & Rawle, 241.
i Kerrick vs. Kerr, 14 Serg. & Rawle, 267. 6 2 Starkie on Evidence, 1203.
46 -
THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
have existed to give rise to this presumption, we find differently
stated at different periods, the older authorities holding that it must
have commenced time out of mind, or, in other words, prior to the
reign of Richard I, and the more modern fixing the time, in analogy
to the Act of Limitations, at twenty years.' And while the deci-
sions have been shortening the time required to raise the presump-
tion, their tendency has also been to give to it greater stability when
raised. Formerly it was, like all other presumptions, rebuttable by
circumstances, and, of course, destroyed if proof could be produced
showing that no grant had been made ;2 now it is held to be conclu-
sive evidence of the existence of a grant or right; being applied as
a presumption juri8 et de lure, whenever by any possibility a right
may be acquired in any manner known to the law.3 When the cir-
cumstances of the use are perfectly consistent with the non-existence
of a grant, they will not give rise to any presumption of this cha-
racter.4 Neither does an enjoyment that originated in mistake,
license, or favor, or wag commenced or continued in a manner not
indicating a claim of right, go to the establishment of a prescrip-
tion. Occupation to be effectual to the creation of a presumptive
title, must have been with the intent to claim, and held as of
right, peaceably :and openly, so that the owner may be presumed to
have had notice of the service imposed upon his estate.5 The same
principle being applied to easements that governs in determining
as to adverse possession of land under the statute of limitations.
Though continuous or uninterrupted enjoyment is held to be neces-
sary, yet such slight interruptions as may be occasioned by the
excessive dryness of the season, or like causes over which the party
has no control, will not prevent the establishment of a title to the
use of the water usually flowing in a water-course.
6
It is upon the party claiming an easement by prescription, to ad-
duce proof that leaves no doubt as to the existence of the essentials
Richard vs. Williams, 7 Wheaton, U. S. 59.
Campbell vs. Wilson, 3 East, 294.
;Tyler vs. Wilkinson, 4 Iason, Cir. Ct. 397.
-Brandt vs. Ogden, 1 Johns. N Y. 156.
Proprietors Kennebec Parch. vs. Skinner, 4 Mass. 416.
'Hall vs. Smith, 6 Scott, 167.
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necessary to constitute such a title.' The right confirmed will be co-
extensive with the former use, and subject only to such restrictions
as guard the rights of others, and are applied in cases where posi-
tive grants have been made. The quantity of water actually used
is not always to be taken as decisive of the extent of the right, for
where water has been diverted, the right will hold as to the whole
quantity so diverted, although only a part of it may have bben ap-
plied to any particular use.2 Where there are no special customs to
the contrary, the same rules govern artificial as natural water-
courses; and title to them may be gained and lost in the same
manner.
3
The general doctrine of prescription does not apply to rights of a
public nature. They can only be transferred by act of the govern-
ment, or, possibly, by a prescription running back so great a length
of time as to give rise to the presumption that the right was thus
granted. 4 Consequently, no rights can be acquired in a boatable
river, inconsistent with the public easement; and every encroach-
ment that interferes with it is regarded as a public nuisance, and is
liable to be abated. And even where the public use of the river
may have been abandoned, and the stream left in an unboatable
condition for more than twenty years, the rights of the public are
not lost.
Rights that have their origin in use may be extinguished by non-
user, or entire abandonment for such length of time as created them.5
To work an, extinguishment for non-user, there must have been an
entire discontinuance for twenty years.6 But the party to whom the
servitude is due; may extinguish it short of that time, by doing any
act incompatible with its nature or existence7 If by such act the
right is extinguished for a moment, it is gone forever." This doctrine
does not apply to easements created by express grant.9 And were
the question here for the first time raised, it might well be doubted
1 2 Greenleaf's Evidence, p. 589. 2 Tyler vs. Wlkinson, 4 Mason, C. C. 397.
3 Magor vs. Chadwick, 11 Ad. & Ellis, 571.
4 Inhabitants of Arundel vs. McCullock, 10 Mass. 70.
5 Shields vs. Arnt, 3 Green's (N. 3.) Ch. 284.
6 Corning vs. Gould, 16 Wend. 531. 7 Taylor vs. Hampton, 4 McCord, (S.C.) 196.
8 8 Kent's Com. 449. 9 Nitzell vs. Paschall, 3 Itawle, (Pa.) 76.
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whether with the view now taken of presumptions, it should be ap-
plied to titles founded on prescription. If the presumption is to be
taken as one juris et de jure, and held as conclusive evidence of a
grant,' it is not very apparent why the rights acquired should differ,
even in respect to the manner of their extinguishment. Such, how-
ever, is the distinction made by the authorities ; and it is regarded by
one of our most eminent legal writers, as establishing a wholesome
and wise qualification of the rule by which grants are presumed,
considering the rapid improvements that are constantly being made
upon real property.2
Whether an easement be acquired by grant or prescription, it
will be extinguished by unity of possession,3 as in cases where the
title to the estate to which the easement belongs, and the estate
servient, become united in the same person. It cannot with pro-
priety be said that a man can have an easement in his own estate.
Even if the easement was a way of necessity, it may, most properly,
be considered as extinguished by unity of possession, and that it is
created anew on the severance of the estate.4 But a natural water-
course,5 beginning and flowing ex jure naturw, is not extinguished
by unity of possession. The benefits that it confers upon the land
through which it flows do not exist by reason of any grant or pre-
scription, and are not extinguished by a possession that merges
minor rights, but do survive during the unity of possession, and
pass with the estate to which by the law of nature they are inci-
dent.
Having during the progress of our investigation seen with what
justness the character and extent of the rights and obligations of
riparian proprietors have been determined, and with what scrupu-
lous care and exactness the most equitable rules have been applied
in governing the enjoyment and transfer of those rights, we leave
the subject, with the conviction that there is none which more per-
fectly illustrates the truth, that the common law is a science of
principles.
I Tyler vs. Wilkinson, ubi sup. ' 3 Kent's Com. 449.
3 'Manning vs. Smith, 6 Conn. 289. 1 Gale & Wheat. on Easm. 60.
5 Sherry vs. Pigott, Hob. R. 339.
